Abstract-Small-scale clouds (SCs) often suffer from resource under-provisioning during peak demand, leading to inability to satisfy service level agreements (SLAs) and consequent loss of customers. One approach to address this problem is for a set of autonomous SCs to share resources among themselves in a costinduced cooperative fashion, thereby increasing their individual capacities (when needed) without having to significantly invest in more resources. In this context, a central problem is how to properly share resources for a price in order to achieve profitable service, while maintaining customer SLAs. To address this problem, we propose the SC-Share framework that utilizes two interacting models: (i) a stochastic performance model that estimates the achieved performance characteristics under given SLA requirements, and (ii) a market-based game-theoretic model that (as shown empirically) converges to efficient resource sharing decisions at market equilibrium. Our results include extensive evaluations that illustrate the utility of the proposed framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
Infrastructure-as-a-Service is quickly becoming a ubiquitous model for providing elastic compute capacity to customers who can access resources in a pay-as-you-go manner without long-term commitments, with rapid scaling (up or down) as needed [1] . Cloud service providers (Amazon AWS [2] , Google Compute Engine [3] , and Microsoft Azure [4] ) allow customers to quickly deploy their services without a large initial infrastructure investment. Proliferation of Smaller-scale Clouds. However, there are some non-trivial concerns in obtaining service from large-scale public clouds, including cost and complexity. Massive cloud environments can be costly and inefficient for some customers (e.g., Blippex [5] ), thus resulting in more and more customers building their own smaller-scale clouds (SCs) [6] for better control of resource usage; for example, it is hard to guarantee network performance in large-scale public clouds due to their multi-tenant environments [7] . Moreover, smaller-scale providers exhibit greater flexibility in customizing services for their users, while large-scale public providers minimize their management overhead by simplifying their services; e.g., Linode [8] distinguishes itself by providing clients with easier and more flexible service customization. The use of SCs is one approach to solve cost and complexity issues.
Despite the potential of SCs, they are likely to suffer from resource under-provisioning during peak demand, which can lead to inability to satisfy service level agreements (SLAs) and consequent loss of customers. SLAs come in many forms, such as the average or maximum waiting time before being served, the probability of requests being rejected, and the amount of resources that each request can obtain. In order not to resort, similarly to large-scale providers, to resource over-provisioning, with all its disadvantages, one approach to realizing the benefits of SCs is to adopt hybrid architectures [9] , [10] that allow private clouds (or small cloud providers) to outsource their requests to larger-scale public providers. However, the use of public clouds can potentially be costly for the small-scale provider.
Motivation. An emerging approach to solve the underprovisioning problem is for SCs to share their resources in a federated cloud environment [11] - [21] , thus (effectively) increasing their individual capacities (when needed) without having to significantly invest in more resources, e.g., this can be helpful when the SCs do not experience peak workloads at the same time. Earlier efforts [16] , [19] characterize the benefits of cloud federations, while [17] also demonstrates that the uncertainty in meeting SLAs can be an incentive enabling sharing of resources among clouds. Moreover, the use of multiple SCs can avoid single points of failure: when one SC suffers an outage, others can be accessed to rent VMs. For instance, on February 28th, 2017, AWS suffered a fivehour outage in the US, causing an estimated damage of $150 million to S&P 500 companies [22] .
However, many of these efforts assume the existence of the cloud federation and largely focus on designing sharing policies in order to maximize the profit of individual SCs [12] , [13] , [20] , [21] . For example, [13] proposes a strategy to terminate less profitable spot instances, in order to accommodate more profitable on-demand VM requests. Moreover, most works do not consider the trade-off between economical benefits (in terms of profit) and performance degradation for individual SCs, which is a significant factor in incentivizing SCs to participate in the cloud federation. Without the analysis of performance degradation due to resource sharing, the feasibility of a federation can be questioned. While [14] studies a federation formation game among cloud providers based on revenue, it only considers a special scenario where all cloud providers share all of their resources with others. In contrast, our work focuses on the fundamental, unanswered question of "how each SCs should share its resources to be profitable, satisfy customer SLAs, and also motivate other SCs to join the federation." Problem Description. We consider an environment with multiple SCs providing on-demand VM instances; an example with 3 SCs is depicted in Fig. 1 . In this work, we also refer to SCs sharing resources with each other as a federation. Each SC has its own SLAs with customers: the maximum waiting time before service of a request is initiated. To satisfy SLAs, SCs use public clouds as a "backup," i.e., they buy additional resources on-demand from large-scale public clouds, when in danger of not being able to meet SLAs. If such SCs form a federation, when an SC exhausts its own resources, it can use resources shared by other SCs at a price lower than that of public clouds. The amount of shared resources directly affects how much workload the federation is able to handle, which in turn affects the profit that each SC is able to achieve. In this sharing scenario, an important question is: Should SCs participate in the federation? If so, how many resources should each SC share? If an SC is too generous (i.e., shares too many of its resources), then it may be in danger of not being able to serve its own workload, resulting in more requests being forwarded to public clouds, thereby reducing profit margins. As a result, an SC should determine the amount of shared resources based on the price of selling and buying resources, i.e., the net profit, compared with the cost of using public clouds. However, if an SC is too selfish, i.e., shares few of its resources for higher profit, then it may get removed from the federation for not being a useful contributor, or the federation may fall apart if most/all SCs tend towards selfish behavior. Thus, another critical question that needs to be addressed is: What prices can make each SC share a reasonable amount of resources so that all SCs will participate in the federation?
Challenges and Contributions. To answer these questions, we make the following contributions: 1) Performance-dependent cost function: Operating costs of an SC depend on the SLA with its customers and on the performance achieved inside the federation; in particular, we need to compute how frequently the SC will need to allocate external resources to satisfy SLAs (e.g., maximum waiting time), and whether it will be able to use resources of other SCs, or only those of public clouds. In Sect. III-B, we develop a detailed performance model to compute such performance metrics for each SC. In turn, these metrics allow us to compute the operating cost of SCs (as defined in Sect. II-B).
To address the high computational complexity of the detailed performance model (due to its large state space, which grows exponentially with the number of SCs), we develop an approximate performance model (Sect. III-C). This model provides accurate estimates of the measures of interest, with linear complexity in the number of SCs, and it allows SCs to keep their SLAs and capacity information private. 2) Sharing market design: The sharing mechanism should motivate SCs to participate, without significant oversight nor management, i.e., they should find an economic benefit in contributing resources to the federation. We design a market-based model to determine the price charged within the federation for the use of shared resources. The model is based on a non-cooperative, repeated game among SCs, each being selfish and trying to maximize its utility; as in real-world scenarios, SCs do not know the utility of other SCs, but they can compute (using our approximate performance model) the operating cost that they would incur for each possible sharing decision. We determine market equilibrium conditions under which the federation is successful and market efficiency is achieved (Sect. IV). 3) Experimental evaluation: In Sect. V, we perform an extensive experimental evaluation to validate the accuracy of our approximate performance model with respect to simulation, and to verify the existence of market equilibria. Results highlight errors lower than 10% for the performance metrics of interest; the proposed pricing model achieves market equilibria and good economic efficiency, successfully incentivizing SCs to stay in the federation. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work that models small-cloud federations as a holistic performance-driven market, integrating engineering aspects (from a performance model) with economic ones (from a market model).
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION In this section, we first describe the architecture of the SC federation, illustrated in Fig. 1 . We then introduce a definition of operating costs of SCs. Finally, we describe our sharing framework, which we call SC-Share.
A. Architecture Description
Each SC has a number of physical servers: through virtualization technology, physical resources (CPU, memory, storage) of SC i are packed into N i homogeneous virtual machines (VMs), which are the resource unit adopted in this work. Customers request the allocation of individual VMs from SCs; the arrival process of VM requests at each SC i is modeled as a Poisson process with rate λ i . The service time of each request at SC i (including the time elapsed from start of VM preparation until its release by the user) is modeled as an exponential random variable with rate μ i . Each SC processes VM requests in FCFS order. If physical servers do not have sufficient resources for a new VM, an SC can reject the request, queue it until more resources are available, or forward it to a public cloud (in a hybrid-cloud model). In Sect. VII, we discuss these assumptions in detail.
In a federation with K SCs (Fig. 1 depicts the case K = 3), we consider the following general scenario: when all VMs at an SC are fully occupied, its new VM requests are queued and can be served either by waiting for local resources to become available, or by purchasing resources from other SCs in the federation, or from a public cloud. In order to participate in the federation, SC i must determine the maximum number of VMs S i to share with other SCs (at a given price) when idle VMs are available; i.e., at any time instant, the number of VMs shared by SC i is I Si i ≤ S i . When all its VMs are occupied, SC i cannot terminate VMs serving requests of other SCs, but it can only stop accepting such requests until it is able to clear its own queue. Each SC i is required to maintain SLAs with its customers; we assume that this corresponds to a bound on the waiting time, i.e., a VM needs to be provided by SC i within Q i time units from its request. If SC i determines that it is not able to satisfy this SLA using resources of the federation, it forwards the request to a public cloud (e.g., Amazon AWS).
B. Cost Metric Description
SCs usually make large up-front investments in infrastructure, and continue to pay for maintenance costs (e.g., power supply and cooling costs). In addition, SCs need to consider costs for forwarding requests to public clouds or for using be random variables representing the number VMs per second used by SC i from the federation and from a public cloud, respectively, to satisfy its SLAs. The net cost for SC i is then
where 
depending on its public cloud provider (these assumptions are discussed in Sect. VII).
Another incentive for participating in the federation is reducing power cost by forwarding VMs to other SCs when they offer VMs at cheaper prices than the cost of instantiating VMs in SC's own environment. For instance, previous efforts [16] , [23] study the sharing mechanisms for cloud providers to minimize their costs. However, in this work, we only focus on the cost of additional resources required to satisfy customers' SLAs. Extending the cost function to incorporate power consumption is a future direction of our work.
C. Cost Metric Evaluation Framework
In order to help SCs determine whether it is beneficial for them to participate in the federation and share their resources, we design the framework SC-Share that allows each SC i to determine the best value of S i , in order to meet its SLA Q i and minimize the expected operating cost C Si i . The essence of SC cooperation in such a federation is the mutual agreement among individual SCs to share their idle resources with other SCs experiencing peak workloads. 1 However, the amount of resources S i that each selfish but honest SC wants to share represents its strategic property that 1 
A. SC without Sharing Resources
We start with a degenerate case, where an SC does not participate in the federation and shares no VMs. Based on SLA requirements, the SC will forward a request to public clouds if service cannot be started within Q i time units after its reception. To compute the cost, we need to estimate the mean number of requests forwarded per second by SC i, P 0 i (we denote it with "0" since no VMs are shared).
To compute P 0 i , we use a Markovian model, where the state represents the number of requests at SC i, as illustrated in Fig. 3 . In this example, we assume that SC i has N i VMs and SLA Q i with its customers. When at least one VM is idle, a new request can be served immediately. However, when all VMs are busy, the probability that the new request is added to the queue of SC i (rather than forwarded to a public cloud) is equal to the probability that service will start in Q i time units, based on the current number of queued requests. Let q i be the number of customers in SC i (i.e., max(0, q i − N i ) customers are waiting in its queue) at the time of the request arrival. Then, given exponential service times with rate μ and the FCFS service policy, the probability of queueing the request (instead of forwarding to a public cloud) is
is less than one if the request cannot be served immediately upon arrival (i.e., q i ≥ N i ).
At the steady state, the expected probability of forwarding a new request to public clouds is then
where π k is the steadystate probability of having k requests in the system. Then, the expected rate at which VM requests are forwarded to public clouds is P 0 i = λ·P F , which can be used in Eq. (1) to compute the cost for SCs not sharing resources, i.e., with O 0 i = I 0 i = 0.
B. Detailed Model for SC federation
The model of a federation with sharing is complex. Given a federation of K SCs, each of which will share a maximum of S i VMs for i = 1, . . . , K, our goal is to estimate the for each SC i. To accurately estimate these parameters, we need to consider the interaction among SCs in the federation. One approach is to build a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC), M, with the following state space S:
where q i is the number of requests from SC i's customers that are either queued or in service at SC i, s i,i is the number of VMs at SC i serving requests from other SCs, and s i,j , i = j is the number of VMs at SC j being used by SC i. Transition rates between states of M can be assigned so as to implement the probabilistic forwarding mechanism of the model for new arrivals, and service of queued requests. Due to lack of space, the transition structure of M is reported in [24] .
Although solving M could give us an accurate prediction of all performance characteristics required in Eq. (1), the corresponding state space S grows exponentially with K. Since re-computation of sharing decisions is needed when significant changes in workload or resource availability occur, a model with a more efficient solution is desirable. Moreover, solving for M requires obtaining detailed SC information (such as the arrival rate, the number of overall VMs, and the SLA) that SCs might not want to release. Thus, each SC should be able to compute the model in a decentralized manner and release as little information as possible.
C. Approximate Model for SC Federation
In this section, we focus on an approximate model that can be solved quickly (as system conditions, such as workload, change) and in a decentralized manner (without releasing too much information to other SCs), but also yields sufficiently accurate results, in order to produce appropriate sharing decisions. By analyzing the detailed model M, we realize that using M allows estimation of performance parameters for all SCs in the federation simultaneously; however, in realistic scenarios, each SC computes its own performance parameters to estimate its cost assuming that other SCs' sharing decisions are fixed; thus, there is no need for the performance model to simultaneously output results for all SCs. Moreover, since we assume that the same cost is charged by all SCs for shared VMs, an SC does not need to distinguish the source or destination of shared VMs. Therefore, we propose a hierarchical approximate model that computes performance parameters iteratively.
Given a federation of K SCs, we consider each SC i = 1, . . . , K in sequence, where SC K is the SC of interest, which we refer to as target SC in the rest of the paper. 
where q i is the total number of requests at SC 
for an inter-event period preceding the remote departure instance of a VM allocated at other SCs by SC i. The detailed computation of these interaction probability vectors is described below.
Let a loc represent the number of VMs shared by SC i and allocated by SCs {1, . . 
Transitions for M 1 . In M 1 , there is only one SC, and no other model affecting the transitions; thus, s 1 = a 1 = 0, and
Transitions for M i . Any transition in M i with i > 1 depends on interaction probability vectors for M i−1 . Given any pair (a loc , a rem ) from states in M i−1 , the transitions corresponding to a request arrival instance at state
fall into one of the following cases:
The new request can use a VM at SC i when there is at least one free VM at SC i, even after considering a loc and a rem from M i−1 during the arrival period:
The new request uses a VM from other SCs. This situation arises when SC i has no idle VMs prior to this arrival instance, but other SCs can provide at least one VM during the preceding inter-event period:
The new request must be queued or forwarded to a public cloud due to no available shared VMs in the federation, where all VMs have been occupied during the previous or current inter-event period by requests from other SCs:
is the number of VMs in the federation currently used by SC i. Given any pair (a loc , a rem ) for states in M i−1 , the transitions corresponding to a service completion instance at SC i for its own customers fall into one of the following cases:
The departure is from VMs of SC i used by SC i itself. If there is at least one job queued in SC i, the freed VM will be used by SC i directly:
where L i = min(q i , N i −s i ) is the number of VMs from SC i used by SC i, for all q i + a loc > N i . However, if there are no queued requests in SC i, the freed VM will be assigned to other SCs with queued jobs: (q i , s i , o i , a i ) in M i for all q i + a loc ≤ N i . If other SCs do not have queued requests, the transition has the same form as in the previous case for queued requests at SC i.
The departure is from VMs of other SCs allocating to SC i. If there are no queued jobs in any SCs, the freed VM will be returned directly:
for all q i + a loc ≤ N i . If at least one request is queued in SCs {1, . . . , i − 1}, SC i must share the VM:
However, if the above conditions are not satisfied and there is at least one job queued in SC i, the VM will still be assigned to SC i, for all q i + a loc > N i :
Interaction Probabilities. As mentioned above, the interaction probabilities describe the probability of different VM allocations from SCs in M i−1 during an inter-event period of M i . Steady-state and transient analysis (using Uniformization [25] to transform the CTMC into a discrete-time Markov chain of the total number of occupied VMs in , s i , o i , a i ) ] and renormalizing their probability masses (see [24] for details). Then, interaction probability vectors for M i−1 and M i are given by the product of the initial state distribution and transient state change during the average inter-arrival time or departure time:
where L i is the number of local busy VMs in (q i , s i , o i , a i ) .
Performance Parameters. Given that π i represents the steady-state probabilities of M i , the performance parameters can be computed as follows:
where
IV. MARKET-BASED MODEL Next, we develop the empirical market-based model for SCShare to determine appropriate sharing decisions for each SC. We first formulate SC utility functions that take performance characteristics (as computed above) into consideration. We then focus on the details of the game and on the notion of market efficiency.
A. SC Utilities
As discussed before, SCs participate in the federation in order to obtain resources and satisfy SLAs at prices cheaper than public clouds, and sell idle resources to other SCs for profit, similarly to spot instances sold by Amazon AWS [26] . To this end, we define SC i's utility U Si i (see Eq. (2) below) from the ratio between (a) the change in net cost of an SC when it participates in the federation versus when it does not, and (b) the change in utilization of an SC when it participates in the federation versus when it does not:
where C 0 i is the cost for SC i when it does not participate in the federation, C Si i is the cost for SC i when it shares a maximum of S i VMs, ρ 0 i is the system utilization (i.e., the fraction of time that SC i's VMs are busy) when not participating in the federation, and ρ Si i is the utilization of SC i when it shares a maximum of S i VMs. It is evident that an SC will try to minimize its cost for satisfying SLAs; thus, we consider the cost reduction as the numerator of Eq. (2). We consider the increment in SCs' utilizations (the denominator of Eq. (2)) because SCs always want to keep utilizing their resources in a certain level (the system utilization of SCs should always increase since all of them have to share resources with others in order to participate in the federation). For instance, an SC would want to increase the amount of shared VMs (i.e., increase its system utilization) to obtain higher profit from the cooperation, but would like to decrease the amount of shared VMs whenever its high system utilization makes it forward more requests to a public cloud (i.e., the rate of cost reduction starts to decrease). The parameter γ in Eq. (2) reflects the importance SC i places on utilization, where γ = 0 means SC i only considers cost reduction, referred to as UF 0 in the rest of the paper, and γ = 1 means SC i considers the marginal cost reduction for utilization changes as the most important factor, referred to as UF 1 in the rest of the paper (γ = 1 gives highest importance to utilization increase since 0 < ρ 
B. Non-Cooperative Game Among SCs
Game Setting. We implement a finite repeated noncooperative game, where the strategy parameter S i of each SC i is the maximum number of VMs shared with other SCs at any given time. Here, we adapt the concept of fictitious play [27] , and assume that each SC does not need to know the utility functions of others. SC i determines S i based on the performance characteristics achieved through sharing with others in the previous round of the game, resulting in a corresponding cost of maintaining the required SLAs. Algorithm 1 describes the details of our non-cooperative repeated game. In the initial round (without knowledge of other SCs' behavior), each SC makes an initial sharing decision arbitrarily, and begins sharing VMs with other SCs. Given the solution of the performance model (which takes {S j , ∀j = i) from the previous round, SC i maximizes its utility again, to determine a new sharing decision S (2) i . This continues until the game converges to an equilibrium point, as explained next. Analyzing Market Equilibria. A Nash equilibrium point of our proposed repeated game represents the game state in which no SC has any incentive to improve its sharing decision [28] . In our work, we are primarily interested in pure strategy Nash Equilibria (NE) [28] as it is more practical to implement and realize for a detailed reasoning. More importantly, we have designed utility functions for the SCs that take as arguments, parameters that are practically relevant to our problem, and are expressions that best reflect SC satisfaction levels. However, in the process, we could not strictly preserve salient mathematical properties related to the utility functions that allow us to derive closed form results about Market Equilibria (ME) from existing seminal works in micro-economic theory, forcing us to take an experimental stance to characterize equilibria. Below, we briefly rationalize our stance in the light of the inapplicability of seminal game-theory theorems in characterizing ME in our work. A detailed explanation of our rationale (along with a description of the salient mathematical properties) is in [24] .
First, deriving closed form results for our work via the seminal result by Nash is not possible due to us (a) dealing with only pure strategy NE, and (b) the utility for an SC might not be quasi-concave [29] in general cases. Second, deriving closed form results for our work via the seminal result by Debreu, Fan, and Glicksberg (derived independently) [30] - [32] in relation to pure strategy NE is not possible due to (a') the quasi-concavity assumption might not always be satisfied (for the peer utility function), which in turn might not guarantee pure strategy NE (violating theorem assumptions), and (b') strategy sets in many applications (including specialized versions of our application setting, i.e., the number of shared VMs is discrete in nature) might not be continuous and infinite [28] , in which case, we would have to go back to using Nash's theorem to guarantee mixed strategy NE (which we do not aim to achieve). Finally, deriving closed form results for our work via the strong seminal result by Dasgupta and Maskin [33] (that also accounts for discontinuous utility functions) is not possible due to the same reasons in (a) and (b) above.
Despite barriers to closed form analysis, we observe through simulation results (see below) the existence of pure strategy NE for infinite strategy spaces (simulated in a discrete manner, thereby becoming a finite game in simulation), and for non quasi-concave SC utility functions. Thus, at least from the experimental results, we observe that for our work, (i) it is not necessary (via the theorem of Nash) for quasi concavity to hold for a pure strategy (also discounting the guarantee of only a mixed strategy via Nash's theorem) Nash equilibrium to exist, and (ii) it is not necessary (via the theorem of Debreu et al.) for quasi concavity to hold for a pure strategy (also discounting the infinite strategy space assumption via the theorem by Debreu et al., as the simulation is discrete in nature) Nash equilibrium to exist.
Reaching Market Equilibria. As addressed above, since we could not afford a mathematical proof, in this work, we simulate the game in Algorithm 1 and determine the equilibrium point empirically for a specific price setting (C P i and C G i ). A traditional heuristic to search for one such equilibium point in the game is the numerical Tâtonnement process [34] that is based on the principle of gradient descent. In our work, due to the discrete nature of the SC strategy elements (e.g., # of VMs to share), we need a discrete version of a Tâtonnement process to reach an equilibrium point. However, the design and analysis of such a process has been shown to be quite challenging [35] ; moreover there is no existing discrete Tâtonnement process to the best of our knowledge. Thus, in our market-based model, we use the non-gradient based Tabu Search heuristic [36] to search for an equilibrium value of S (r) i , and reach the global optimum in most cases (by starting at different initial points).
Fairness Among SCs. A joint social end goal, serving as a benchmark of how well selfish non-cooperative SCs participate in the federation w.r.t. their sharing behavior, is to (a) reach a certain level of fairness (see below for details) among SCs in terms of their utilities, and (b) maximize their individual utilities at ME. It is important to note here that if we only compare the fairness allocations among SCs, the scenario where all SCs share nothing with others can also be a most fair allocation, but it results in sub-optimal individual utilities (at times an individual utility of zero for the SCs) at ME (see Sect. V-B). To achieve our joint social end goal, we need to find a specific price setting (the ratio of C G i and C P i ) that enables all SCs to maximize their utilities through sharing VMs while at the same time maintaining an appropriate level of fairness. In regard to adopting an appropriate fairness measure, we consider in our work the widely popular notion of weighted α-fairness [37] to combine individual SC utilities U Si i through the function
Here, S i , the maximum number of shared VMs, is the weight used to combine the α-fairness metric of each SC i, while the parameter α controls the fairness of utility allocations among SCs. In this work, we evaluate three popular α-fairness utility functions, achieving different trade-offs between fairness and economic efficiency: (i) α = 0, which gives the utilitarian function [38] (denoting minimum fairness), (ii) α = ∞, which results in max-min fairness, and (iii) α = 1, which gives proportional fairness. For each fairness function defined by α, our goal is to find the best price setting that motivates SCs, based on their system loads, to participate in the federation and share more of their VMs, i.e., thereby achieving higher values of α-fair functions. We assume that SCs always report the true decisions and utility without releasing detailed information.
(The design of an economic mechanism to enforce truthful communication between SCs is beyond the scope here.)
V. EVALUATION AND VALIDATION
We first validate the accuracy of our performance model, the results of which are needed as input parameters to the market-based model. To this end, we compute the solution of our approximate model (in Sect. III) numerically, and compare it to the solution of the exact model (computed through a C++-based simulator). We then use our market-based model to investigate how the price of shared VMs from other SCs affects weighted utilities.
A. Performance model validation
SC without Sharing Resources. Here, we start with the accuracy evaluation of our forward probability estimation in Sect. III-A, since this is a measure used by all other models. Moreover, to demonstrate that SCs have better incentives to participate in the federation, we compare the results of two clouds, which have 10 and 100 VMs respectively, with SLAs of Q i = 0.2 and Q i = 0.5 under various Poisson arrival rates; each request has an exponential service time with rate 1. In order to correctly compare the results among two SCs, in Fig. 5 , we show the estimated forward probability under different system utilizations (by increasing the arrival rate). As shown in the figure, for both clouds, the probability of forwarding is higher for smaller QoS values, and our estimation properly predicts the forward probability under different settings. It is easy to see that the cloud with fewer VMs has higher forwarding probability under the same system utilization. Thus, if an SC does not want to increase its investments in infrastructure, it needs some mechanism to decrease its forwarding probability to reduce the cost of satisfying SLAs. In the following experiments, each SC in the federation has 10 VMs by default with exponential service time with rate μ = 1 and QoS Q i = 0.2.
Approximate Model. In this section, we perform extensive experiments to validate the accuracy of the approximate model presented in Sect. III-C. Here, we want to investigate how well our approximate model performs as a function of the different number of shared VMs and system utilizations. We begin with a 2-SC federation scenario. We fix the arrival rate of one SC to 7 and the number of shared VMs to 5 (out of 10 total VMs), and vary the number of shared VMs and system load (by changing the arrival rate) of another SC, referred to as target SC. Figures 6a and 6b illustrate the performance metrics of interest when the target SC shares 1 and 9 VM(s) under different system loads. (Due to lack of space, we omit P (1)) remains within 10% of the exact solution.
We now illustrate how the approximation error increases in larger systems. Firstly, we consider a 10-SC federation scenario (each with a total of 10 VMs) and fix, for 9 SCs, the number of shared VMs to (3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1 ) and the arrival rate to (7, 7, 7, 8, 8, 8, 9, 9, 9) , respectively. Figures 6c and 6d illustrate the performance metrics of interest when the target SC shares 1 and 5 VM(s) under different system loads. We still observe that the difference between the exact and approximate I
Si i
and O Si i remains small (within 10% of the exact solution) when the system utilization is lower than 0.8 (within 20% when the system utilization is lower than 0.9). Generally, we can observe that the results of approximated I
are under-estimated when the system has very high utilization because our approximate model breaks the direct relationship between the target SC and all other SCs (we only consider the connection between SC i and SC i − 1); thus, the target SC might under-estimate the number of queued requests at all other SCs. For the same reason, the results of approximated O Si i are over-estimated. However, the difference between I
and O Si i remains accurate (within 20% of the exact solution) when the system utilization is lower than 0.9. Secondly, we consider again a 2-SC federation scenario, with 100 VMs per SC. We fix the the number of shared VMs at 10 for both SCs, and vary system load for both of them. Figures 6e and 6f illustrate the performance metrics of interest when one SC has system utilization of 0.8 and 0.9 under different system loads of the target SC. We still observe that the difference between I
and O
remains accurate (within 20% of the exact solution) when the system utilization of the target SC is lower than 0.9. 
B. Market-based Model Evaluation
Here, we perform experiments to investigate how
, affect the criteria for SCs to participate in the federation. Due to lack of space, we focus on evaluating 3-SC scenarios (in Fig. 7) , where each SC has 10 VMs (as a representative example) in the evaluation, to better explain the effects of system utilizations on the game model; results for other SC-scenarios are qualitatively similar. Here, we display the ratio of the achieved value of the W metric (see Sect IV-B) to the (empirical) market efficient value of the W metric, as a measure of federation efficiency, for a given mixture of SC utility functions. If no SCs are willing to participate in the federation, we depict it as zero federation efficiency (since the value of the W metric is always greater than zero).
We first consider scenarios where the 3 SCs have significantly different system loads (ρ i = 0.58, 0.73, 0.84). and low utilization SCs do not generate enough demand to let high utilization SCs remain profitable. If all SCs used UF 1 , they would only share 1 VM with others even when C G i /C P i increases because, in our setting, the increase in marginal cost reduction with increase in number of shared VMs is not sufficient to encourage SCs to contribute more VMs. Moreover, since all SCs only shared 1 VM when they use UF 1 , both proportional W metric and max-min W metric achieve the same maximum state (due to the same weight for all SCs in Eq. (3)), as shown in Fig. 7b . In other cases, the results of the proportional W metric depend on the behavior of the lower utilization SCs. If these SCs choose UF 0 , their cost reductions with increase in number of shared VMs are greater than high utilization SCs; thus, the maximum proportional W metric can only happen when all SCs share few VMs.
In Fig. 7c , we consider scenarios where 3 SCs have similar high system loads (ρ i = 0.73, 0.79, 0.84), where all of them consider UF 0 . In this scenario, the results are similar to the cases in Fig. 7a ; however, unlike the scenario where SCs having significant different utilizations are not incentivized to join the federation when C 
C. Computational Overhead
In this section, we discuss the cost of computing our performance model and market-based model. Performance Model. Our approximate model can significantly reduce the state space size of the detailed Markov model (see Sect. III-C). For instance, in a 10-SC scenario with each SC sharing 5 VMs, the detailed model has ≈ 9 billion states, whose generation and solution requires a substantial amount of space and computation time. However, our approximate model only needs to build ten Markov models with ≈ 1 million states each, and compute their steady-state probabilities. Fig. 8a illustrates the computation time of the approximate model with 2 − 10 SCs, each with 10 VMs and sharing 2 VMs. We observe that the computation time increases with the number of SCs due to generating and solving larger linear systems. Our approximate model significantly reduces the state space size, estimating the results faster and with less memory. Market-based Model. SCs use Algorithm 1 to repetitively adjust their sharing decisions, S i , at each round of the game in order to maximize their utilities until reaching an equilibrium state (see Sect. IV-B); thus, the market-based model's computational time depends on the Tabu Search distance and on the number of SCs. We consider scenarios with 2−8 SCs in the federation, each with 100 VMs. The number of iterations required decreases as more SCs participate (see Fig. 8b ). This occurs because any decision change produces bigger effects in a smaller federation. Similarly, the influence of a larger search distance is bigger in a smaller federation. For example, our proposed market-based model needs ≈ 5 iterations to reach equilibrium when only 2 SCs are in the federation.
VI. RELATED WORK
We give an overview of efforts related to ours and highlight the relevant differences. Works on hybrid clouds [9] , [10] are related as they allow private (or smaller-scale) clouds to outsource their requests to large-scale public providers. However, since that can potentially be costly for a smallscale provider, our work differs in that it focuses on a sharing framework, while minimizing cost of using public clouds.
Earlier efforts also study the competition and cooperation within a federated cloud. For instance, authors in [16] , [20] characterize the cloud federation to help cloud providers maximize their profits via dynamic pricing models. Earlier efforts [15] , [39] also study the competition and cooperation among cloud providers, but assume that each cloud provider has sufficient resources to serve all users' requests, while [15] incorporates a penalty function to address the service delay penalty. Authors in [40] propose a hierarchical cooperative game theoretic model for better resources integration and achieving a higher profit in the federation. Similarly to our work, [14] studies a federation formation game but assumes that cloud providers share everything with others, while [19] adopts cooperative game theoretic approaches to model a cloud federation and study the motivation for cloud providers to participate in a federation.
Another line of work focuses on designing sharing policies in the federation to obtain higher profit. For instance, [18] proposes a decentralized cloud platform SpotCloud [41] , a real-world system allowing customers or SCs to sell idle compute resources at specified prices, and presents a resource pricing scheme (resulting from a repeated seller game) plus an optimal resource provisioning algorithm. [12] employs various cooperation strategies under varying workloads, to reduce the request rejection rate (i.e., the efficiency metric in [12] ). Another effort [13] combines resource outsourcing and rejection of less profitable requests in order to increase resource utilization and profit. [21] proposes to efficiently deploy distributed applications on federated clouds by considering security requirements, the cost of computing power, data storage and inter-cloud communication. [11] groups resources of various SCs into computational units, in order to serve customers' requests. [17] proposes to incorporate both historical and expected future revenue into VM sharing decisions in order to maximize an SC's profit. Differences and Drawbacks. Our work differs from previous efforts in that we explicitly consider consequences of resource sharing on the resulting performance delivered to customers. In contrast, none of the above efforts explicitly model the system performance under the considered resource sharing environment. They either assume that resources can be reclaimed (when needed), thus resulting in lack of reliability of shared resources, or they assume that an analytical performance characterization is possible (but do not propose a solution to estimate it). Such an analytical characterization is an important contribution of our work. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work addressing the explicit interactions between performance model and economic model. Moreover, unlike previous efforts that adopt the cooperative game theoretic approach, our work studying the non-cooperative game is more practical since no SC would be willing to share its utility and capacity information with others.
VII. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We made a number of assumptions in our models; here, we discuss the rationale behind the main assumptions. Due to lack of space, a more detailed explanation is given in [24] . Homogeneous VMs. In practice, each cloud provider offers heterogeneous VM profiles (e.g., memory-optimized, CPUoptimized, or GPU-enabled), which reserve hardware resources on pre-specified machine pools shared by multiple VMs [42] . However, many cloud providers, such as Amazon LightSail, DigitalOcean, and Linode, offer VM configurations with very similar specifications (e.g., $10/month instances from Linode, DigitalOcean, and Amazon Lightsail currently provide 1 CPU core, 30 GB SSD, 2 TB data transfer/month, 1 or 2 GB of RAM). We believe that it is very likely that SCs would negotiate the sharing policies for each VM profile separately, given that these profiles correspond to different prices and capacities at each SC. In this case, our model of homogeneous resources can be applied repeatedly to each VM profile. Sharing policies for hardware resources (rather than VM profiles) would require the introduction of scheduling and packing algorithms within our performance model, which is beyond the scope of this work. I.I.D. Exponential Service Times. Depending on the target application, requests can require two or more VMs to complete a job, and service times of different requests likely have different distributions. In these cases, our Markov model can address non-exponential service times by introducing phasetype distributions that fit the moments of service time distributions from real-world traces [43] . Similarly, batch arrivals can introduce with batch Markovian arrival processes (BMAPs). Unfortunately, both approaches result in larger state spaces, with the effect of increasing computation costs for the analysis of our performance model. In this paper, we motivated the formation of a federation using exponentially-distributed service times and single-VM requests to reduce the computational cost. To relax these assumptions, one of our future goals focuses on leveraging symbolic analysis methods for Markov chains, e.g., methods based on multi-terminal binary decision diagrams (MTBDDs), or lumping of Markov processes, to further cope with the state-space explosion. Stable System Parameters. This work focuses on establishing a long-term relationship in the federation: in reality, unlike spot clouds, where decisions must be made in a very short period of time, each SC would collect sufficient historical traces for a longer period of time before joining the federation, and update its sharing decisions after observing a long-term change in system parameters. Our approximate model is designed to deliver the results for this kinds of updates. Future Work. SC-Share evaluates resource sharing benefits among SCs by accounting only for the cost of using VMs. However, there are other parameters that SC-Share could account for in evaluating resource sharing benefits: (i) privacy concerns/risks of sharing/forwarding resources within cloud entities, (ii) data transmission costs for forwarding VM requests among cloud entities, and (iii) power consumption costs of running physical servers hosting VMs. We plan to incorporate these parameters into the SC-Share framework as part of future work.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed SC-Share to enable small-scale clouds to share their resources in a profitable manner while satisfying customer SLAs. Our framework is based on two interacting models: (i) an approximate performance model with an efficient solution that is able to produce sufficiently accurate estimates of performance characteristics of interest; and (ii) a market-based model that results in sharing policies which properly incentivize SCs to participate in the federation while achieving market success. SC-Share can suggest different price settings in different federations in order to achieve sufficient market efficiency. Moreover, SC-Share shows that even when the price of shared VMs is equal to the price of using a public cloud, a federation can still be formed under certain criteria.
